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Dynamic CEO Compensation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Lel, Ugur & Tepe, Mete, 2021. "Investor horizon and managerial short-termism," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1-20.
  2. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03391936, HAL.
  3. Cronqvist, Henrik & Ladika, Tomislav & Pazaj, Elisa & Sautner, Zacharias, 2024. "Limited attention to detail in financial markets: Evidence from reduced-form and structural estimation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
  4. Miguel Antón & Florian Ederer & Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, 2023. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 131(5), pages 1294-1355.
  5. Edward D. Van Wesep & Brian Waters, 2022. "Bonus Season: A Theory of Periodic Labor Markets and Coordinated Bonuses," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5464-5492, July.
  6. Guasoni, Paolo & Muhle-Karbe, Johannes & Xing, Hao, 2017. "Robust portfolios and weak incentives in long-run investments," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60577, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  7. Pagès, Henri, 2013. "Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-54.
  8. Murat Alp Celik & Xu Tian, 2023. "Agency Frictions, Managerial Compensation, and Disruptive Innovations," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 51, pages 16-38, December.
  9. Paweł Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2023. "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 371-402.
  10. Oliver Levine & Brent Glover, 2014. "Idiosyncratic Risk and the Manager," 2014 Meeting Papers 736, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Mayer, Simon, 2022. "Financing breakthroughs under failure risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 807-848.
  12. Alex Edmans & Vivian W. Fang & Katharina A. Lewellen, 2013. "Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia," NBER Working Papers 19407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
  14. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9ko9ord4mpg9odaj is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Michael Hilmer, 2014. "Bailouts, Bonuses and Bankers' Short-Termism," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2014-17, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  16. Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2020. "Repeated delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  17. Stefano Colonnello & Giuliano Curatola & Shuo Xia, 2022. "Trading Away Incentives," Working Papers 2022:16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  18. Tiziano De Angelis & Peter Tankov & Olivier David Zerbib, 2023. "Climate Impact Investing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(12), pages 7669-7692, December.
  19. Dow, James & Han, Jungsuk & Sangiorgi, Francesco, 2024. "The short-termism trap: Catering to informed investors with limited horizons," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
  20. Hengjie Ai & Dana Kiku & Rui Li & Jincheng Tong, 2021. "A Unified Model of Firm Dynamics with Limited Commitment and Assortative Matching," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 317-356, February.
  21. Jiang, Wei & Liu, Yunguo & Lobo, Gerald J. & Xu, Yue, 2019. "Deferred cash compensation and risk-taking: Evidence from the Chinese banking industry," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 432-448.
  22. Te Bao & Edward Halim & Charles N. Noussair & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2021. "Managerial incentives and stock price dynamics: an experimental approach," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 617-648, June.
  23. Eduardo Abi Jaber & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2025. "Gaussian agency problems with memory and linear contracts," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 143-176, January.
  24. Dizon-Ross, Rebecca & Aggarwal, Shilpa & Zucker, Ariel, 2020. "Incentivizing Behavioral Change: The Role of Time Preferences," CEPR Discussion Papers 14751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Sonia B. Di Giannatale & Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral & Genaro Basulto, 2024. "Exploring Executive Bargaining Dynamics: An Empirical Investigation," Working Papers DTE 633, CIDE, División de Economía.
  26. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2021. "Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation [Motivating Innovation in Newly Public Firms]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(3), pages 1253-1278.
  27. Paul Povel & Günter Strobl, 2024. "Lying to Speak the Truth: Selective Manipulation and Improved Information Transmission," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(6), pages 4303-4352, December.
  28. Brent Glover & Oliver Levine, "undated". "Idiosyncratic Risk and the Manager," GSIA Working Papers 2013-E25, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  29. Michael Ewens Author-1-Name-First: Michael Author-1-Name-Last: Ewens & Ramana Nanda Author-2-Name-First: Ramana Author-2-Name-Last: Nanda & Christopher Stanton Author-3-Name-First: Christopher Author-, 2020. "Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship," Harvard Business School Working Papers 20-119, Harvard Business School, revised Sep 2023.
  30. Alessandro Fedele & Luca Panaccione, 2020. "Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 223-241, July.
  31. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2015_005 is not listed on IDEAS
  32. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  33. Siegert, Caspar, 2014. "Bonuses and managerial misbehaviour," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 93-105.
  34. Eduardo Abi Jaber & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," Post-Print hal-03783062, HAL.
  35. Çolak, Gönül & Korkeamäki, Timo, 2021. "CEO mobility and corporate policy risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
  36. Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Ferreira, Daniel & Goh, Lisa, 2022. "Changes in CEO stock option grants: a look at the numbers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115609, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  37. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2020. "Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
  38. Ferreira, Daniel & Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Goh, Lisa, 2017. "Changes in CEO Stock Option Grants: A Look at the Numbers," CEPR Discussion Papers 12318, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  39. John Thanassoulis, 2011. "Industrial Structure, Executives' Pay And Myopic Risk Taking," Economics Series Working Papers 571, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  40. Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 775-818.
  41. Dirk Hackbarth & Alejandro Rivera & Tak-Yuen Wong, 2022. "Optimal Short-Termism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(9), pages 6477-6505, September.
  42. Qian Qi, 2023. "Artificial Intelligence and Dual Contract," Papers 2303.12350, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
  43. Michael Haylock, 2022. "Distributional differences in the time horizon of executive compensation," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 157-186, January.
  44. Villeneuve, Stéphane & Abi Jaber, Eduardo, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," TSE Working Papers 22-1363, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  45. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F. Garrett, 2023. "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(3), pages 1025-1075, May.
  46. Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
  47. Jokivuolle, Esa & Keppo, Jussi & Yuan, Xuchuan, 2015. "Bonus caps, deferrals and bankers' risk-taking," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 5/2015, Bank of Finland.
  48. Eduardo Abi Jaber & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," Working Papers hal-03783062, HAL.
  49. Humphery-Jenner, Mark & Lisic, Ling Lei & Nanda, Vikram & Silveri, Sabatino Dino, 2016. "Executive overconfidence and compensation structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 533-558.
  50. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Post-Print hal-03391936, HAL.
  51. Fouad Ben Abdelaziz & Souhir Neifar & Khamoussi Halioui, 2022. "Multilevel optimal managerial incentives and audit fees to limit earnings management practices," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 311(2), pages 587-610, April.
  52. Sun, Bo, 2014. "Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 276-290.
  53. Guthrie, Graeme, 2021. "A dynamic model of managerial entrenchment and the positive incentives it creates," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
  54. Arantxa Jarque, 2014. "The Complexity of CEO Compensation," Working Paper 14-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  55. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018. "The optimal timing of CEO compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
  56. Stanimir Morfov & Manuel Santos, 2017. "A Model of Managerial Talent: Addressing Some Puzzles in CEO Compensation," Working Papers 2017-03, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  57. Eduardo Abi Jaber & St'ephane Villeneuve, 2022. "Gaussian Agency problems with memory and Linear Contracts," Papers 2209.10878, arXiv.org.
  58. Shan, Yaping, 2019. "Incentives for research agents and performance-vested equity-based compensation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 44-69.
  59. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
  60. Colak, Gonul & Liljeblom, Eva, 2022. "Easy cleanups or forbearing improvements: The effect of CEO tenure on successor’s performance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  61. Zsolt Bihary & P'eter Cs'oka & P'eter Ker'enyi & Alexander Szimayer, 2019. "Self-respecting worker in the precarious gig economy: A dynamic principal-agent model," Papers 1902.10021, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
  62. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-604.
  63. Arie, Guy, 2016. "Dynamic costs and moral hazard: A duality-based approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 1-50.
  64. Zoë B. Cullen & Bobak Pakzad‐Hurson, 2023. "Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(3), pages 765-802, May.
  65. Williams, Noah, 2015. "A solvable continuous time dynamic principal–agent model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 989-1015.
  66. Yuanzhan Chen & Zhuo Jin & Bo Qin, 2023. "Economic Value Added in performance measurement: A simulation approach and empirical evidence," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(1), pages 109-140, March.
  67. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9ko9ord4mpg9odaj is not listed on IDEAS
  68. Jokivuolle, Esa & Keppo, Jussi & Yuan, Xuchuan, 2015. "Bonus caps, deferrals and bankers' risk-taking," Research Discussion Papers 5/2015, Bank of Finland.
  69. Jean-Pierre Danthine & John Donaldson, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A General Equilibrium Perspective," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 269-286, April.
  70. Paolo Guasoni & Johannes Muhle-Karbe & Hao Xing, 2013. "Robust Portfolios and Weak Incentives in Long-Run Investments," Papers 1306.2751, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2014.
  71. Athanasakou, Vasiliki & Ferreira, Daniel & Goh, Lisa, 2022. "Changes in CEO stock option grants: A look at the numbers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
  72. John Thanassoulis, 2013. "Industry Structure, Executive Pay, and Short-Termism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 402-419, June.
  73. Axelson, Ulf & Bond, Philip, 2015. "Wall Street occupations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37448, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  74. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2015. "Pay Schemes, Bargaining, and Competition for Talent," Working Paper Series 1100, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  75. Pag s, H., 2009. "Bank incentives and optimal CDOs," Working papers 253, Banque de France.
  76. Piskorski, Tomasz & Westerfield, Mark M., 2016. "Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 242-281.
  77. Sebastian Gryglewicz & Barney Hartman-Glaser & Geoffery Zheng, 2020. "Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay for Performance: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1248-1277, March.
  78. repec:bof:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201503041096 is not listed on IDEAS
  79. repec:zbw:bofrdp:urn:nbn:fi:bof-201503041096 is not listed on IDEAS
  80. Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2013. "CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 659-674.
  81. Shuhei Aoki & Makoto Nirei, 2014. "Zipf's Law, Pareto's Law, and the Evolution of Top Incomes in the U.S," Working Papers e074, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
  82. John Thanassoulis, 2013. "Short-Term Shareholders, Bubbles, And CEO Myopia," Economics Series Working Papers 663, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  83. repec:oup:rfinst:v:21:y:2017:i:5:p:1805-1846. is not listed on IDEAS
  84. Ju, Nengjiu & Leland, Hayne & Senbet, Lemma W., 2014. "Options, option repricing in managerial compensation: Their effects on corporate investment risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 628-643.
  85. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," SciencePo Working papers hal-03391936, HAL.
  86. Stacey Beaumont & Raluca Ratiu & David Reeb & Glenn Boyle & Philip Brown & Alexander Szimayer & Raymond Silva Rosa & David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris & Bryan Howieson & Zoltan Ma, 2016. "Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 685-771, December.
  87. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez & Yao Thibaut Kpegli & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2023. "Against the Odds! The Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives is Alive and Well," Working Papers 2305, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  88. Thanassoulis, John & Tanaka, Misa, 2015. "Bankers' pay and excessive risk," Bank of England working papers 558, Bank of England.
  89. Maideu-Morera, Gerard, 2024. "Firm Size and Compensation Dynamics with Risk Aversion and Persistent Private Information," TSE Working Papers 24-1535, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  90. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes," Discussion Papers 1579, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  91. Ewens, Michael & Nanda, Ramana & Stanton, Christopher, 2020. "Founder-CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital-Backed Entrepreneurship," SocArXiv rku3m_v1, Center for Open Science.
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