Pay Schemes, Bargaining, and Competition for Talent
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- Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020.
"Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
- Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2017. "Delegation of Investment Decisions, and Optimal Renumeration of Agents," Working Paper Series 1171, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 02 Aug 2020.
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More about this item
Keywords
Principal-agent; Investment; Endogenous uncertainty; Contract; Bonus; Penalty;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CFN-2016-01-03 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CTA-2016-01-03 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2016-01-03 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2016-01-03 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PPM-2016-01-03 (Project, Program and Portfolio Management)
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