Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01208-5
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More about this item
Keywords
Moral hazard; Compensation packages; Reshuffling; Independent preferences;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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