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Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Josephson, Jens & Shapiro, Joel, 2020. "Credit ratings and structured finance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
  2. Doherty, Neil A. & Kartasheva, Anastasia V. & Phillips, Richard D., 2012. "Information effect of entry into credit ratings market: The case of insurers' ratings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 308-330.
  3. Mary Gugerty, 2009. "Signaling virtue: voluntary accountability programs among nonprofit organizations," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 42(3), pages 243-273, August.
  4. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2012. "The Credit Ratings Game," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 85-112, February.
  5. Sabyasachi Das, 2016. "Certification Under Oligopolistic Competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 251-271, September.
  6. Pierre Fleckinger & Matthieu Glachant & Gabrielle Moineville, 2017. "Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 242-274, February.
  7. Fischer, Thomas, 2015. "Market structure and rating strategies in credit rating markets – A dynamic model with matching of heterogeneous bond issuers and rating agencies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 39-56.
  8. Jan Myslivecek, 2008. "How to Price Imperfect Certification," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp364, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  9. Anil K. Kashyap & Natalia Kovrijnykh, 2016. "Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(2), pages 420-456.
  10. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Lovo, Stefano, 2011. "Reputation as an Entry Barrier in the Credit Rating Industry," IDEI Working Papers 675, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 25 May 2012.
  11. Alexandre de Cornière & Greg Taylor, 2019. "A model of biased intermediation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 854-882, December.
  12. Pollrich, Martin & Wagner, Lilo, 2016. "Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 345-360.
  13. Fasten, Erik R. & Hofmann, Dirk, 2010. "Two-sided certification: The market for rating agencies," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-007, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
  14. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Lovo, Stefano, 2013. "Credit rating industry: A helicopter tour of stylized facts and recent theories," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 643-651.
  15. Gu, Yiquan, 2008. "Imperfect Certification," Ruhr Economic Papers 78, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  16. Suvorov Anton & Tsybuleva Natalia, 2010. "Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-35, November.
  17. Marta Allegra Ronchetti, 2018. "What if I knew you did it? An analysis of preliminary ratings’ disclosure under competition," Discussion Papers 2018/09, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).
  18. Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "Collective Reputation and Market Structure: Regulating the Quality vs Quantity Trade-of," Working Papers hal-00243080, HAL.
  19. Alexander E. Saak, 2017. "The Value of Delegated Quality Control," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 309-335, June.
  20. Becker, Bo & Milbourn, Todd, 2011. "How did increased competition affect credit ratings?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 493-514, September.
  21. Xujin Pu & Huanzhen Zhang, 2016. "Voluntary Certification of Agricultural Products in Competitive Markets: The Consideration of Boundedly Rational Consumers," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(9), pages 1-13, September.
  22. Andreas Ortmann & Katarína Svítková, 2007. "Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism in Transition Economies: Evidence, Theory, and Open Questions," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(2), pages 99-114.
  23. Katarina Svitkova & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism: Theory and Suggestive Evidence," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp288, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  24. Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2017. "Certification and Market Transparency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1842-1868.
  25. Stolper, Anno, 2009. "Regulation of credit rating agencies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(7), pages 1266-1273, July.
  26. Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer & Christian Siemering, 2022. "Advertisement-financed credit ratings," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 46(1), pages 188-206, January.
  27. Roland Strausz, 2017. "A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1430-1476, June.
  28. Gill, David & Sgroi, Daniel, 2012. "The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1247-1260.
  29. Alexandre Gaudeul & Bruno Jullien, 2005. "E-commerce, two-sided markets and info-mediation," Industrial Organization 0503014, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Apr 2005.
  30. Mark D. Flood & Jonathan Katz & Stephen J. Ong & Adam Smith, 2013. "Cryptography and the economics of supervisory information: balancing transparency and confidentiality," Working Papers (Old Series) 1312, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  31. Douglas J. Elliott & Greg Feldberg & Andreas Lehnert, 2013. "The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the United States," Working Papers 13-08, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
  32. Gao, Ruoxin & Yao, Shiqing & Yang, Ruina, 2024. "Responsible audit and consumer awareness under collusion risk," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 314(2), pages 466-476.
  33. Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner, "undated". "Informational opacity and honest certication," BDPEMS Working Papers 2013001, Berlin School of Economics.
  34. Sangiorgi, Francesco & Spatt, Chester, 2017. "The Economics of Credit Rating Agencies," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 12(1), pages 1-116, December.
  35. Francesco Giuli & Marco Manzo, 2009. "Enhancing Bank Transparency: What Role for the Supervision Authority?," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 56(4), pages 1-58, December.
  36. Andres, Christian & Betzer, André & Limbach, Peter, 2014. "Underwriter reputation and the quality of certification: Evidence from high-yield bonds," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 97-115.
  37. Farkas, Miklós, 2021. "Competition, communication and rating bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 637-656.
  38. Alexandre Gaudeul, 2004. "Internet Intermediaries' Editorial Content Quality," Industrial Organization 0409005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  39. Mihaela Schaar & Simpson Zhang, 2015. "A dynamic model of certification and reputation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 509-541, April.
  40. Kraft, Pepa, 2015. "Do rating agencies cater? Evidence from rating-based contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 264-283.
  41. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2013. "Regulatory Capture by Sophistication," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79991, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  42. Bizzotto, Jacopo & Rüdiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien, 2020. "Testing, disclosure and approval," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  43. Buehler, Benno & Schuett, Florian, 2014. "Certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 493-511.
  44. Eloïc Peyrache & Lucía Quesada, 2011. "Intermediaries, Credibility and Incentives to Collude," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 1099-1133, December.
  45. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2013. "Ratings quality over the business cycle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 62-78.
  46. Miklós-Thal, Jeanine & Schumacher, Heiner, 2013. "The value of recommendations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 132-147.
  47. Loerke, Petra & Niedermayer, Andreas, 2015. "Crises and Rating Agencies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 521, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  48. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, 2013. "Corrupt intermediaries in international business transactions: between make, buy and reform," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 349-366, June.
  49. Loerke, Petra & Niedermayer, Andras, 2018. "On the effect of aggregate uncertainty on certification intermediaries’ incentives to distort ratings," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 20-48.
  50. Opp, Christian C. & Opp, Marcus M. & Harris, Milton, 2013. "Rating agencies in the face of regulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 46-61.
  51. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "A Theory of Crowdfunding," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 2, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  52. Alessio Piccolo & Joel Shapiro, 2022. "Credit Ratings and Market Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(10), pages 4425-4473.
  53. Gunter Löffler, 2013. "Can Market Discipline Work in the Case of Rating Agencies? Some Lessons from Moody’s Stock Price," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 43(2), pages 149-174, April.
  54. Marta Allegra Ronchetti, 2015. "Credit Rating Agency, Preliminary Ratings and Contact Disclosure," Discussion Papers 2015/04, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).
  55. Prüfer, Jens, 2018. "Trusting privacy in the cloud," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 52-67.
  56. Kraft, Pepa & Xie, Yuan & Zhou, Ling, 2020. "The intraday timing of rating changes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
  57. Shapiro, Joel & Piccolo, Alessio, 2017. "Credit Ratings and Market Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 11961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  58. Gaëlle Balineau & Ivan Dufeu, 2012. "The credibility of the Fairtrade system [Le système Fairtrade : une garantie pour les consommateurs ?]," Post-Print hal-02794962, HAL.
  59. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joel Shapiro, 2011. "Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 120-124, May.
  60. Christian Andres & André Betzer & Peter Limbach, 2013. "Underwriter Reputation and the Quality of Certification: Evidence from High-Yield Bonds," Schumpeter Discussion Papers SDP13006, Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal, University Library.
  61. Marta Allegra Ronchetti, 2018. "Preliminary credit ratings and contact disclosure," Discussion Papers 2018/02, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM).
  62. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2010-007 is not listed on IDEAS
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