How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment

Citations

Cited by:

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24. Seshimo, Hiroyuki, 2022. "Optimal extended liability rule in a competitive financial market with heterogeneous borrower firms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
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29. Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington, 2001. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 724-730, June.
30. Gérard Mondello, 2012. "Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability, and Care Effort under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(2), pages 232-251, June.
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