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A Model of Optimal Incapacitation

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Vidal, Jordi Blanes I & Kirchmaier, Tom, 2015. "The effect of police response time on crime detection," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64979, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. Ullman, Darin F., 2016. "Locked and not loaded: First time offenders and state ignition interlock programs," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-13.
  3. Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 278-288, April.
  4. Ben Vollaard, 2013. "Preventing crime through selective incapacitation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(567), pages 262-284, March.
  5. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
  6. Alessandro Barbarino & Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2014. "The Incapacitation Effect of Incarceration: Evidence from Several Italian Collective Pardons," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 1-37, February.
  7. Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Deterrence and Incapacitation Models of Criminal Punishment: Can the Twain Meet?," Working papers 2009-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  8. Peter Wijck, 2013. "The economics of pre-crime interventions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 441-458, June.
  9. Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
  10. Éric Langlais, 2010. "Les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 61(2), pages 263-280.
  11. Aurelie Ouss & Alexander Peysakhovich, 2015. "When Punishment Doesn't Pay: "Cold Glow" and Decisions to Punish," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
  12. Thomas J. Miceli, 2012. "Escalating Interest in Escalating Penalties," Working papers 2012-08, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  13. Alice Guerra & Tore Nilssen, 2023. "Optimal sentencing with recurring crimes and adjudication errors," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 33-42, June.
  14. Friehe, Tim & Tabbach, Avraham, 2013. "Preventive enforcement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 1-12.
  15. Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2006. "Incentive and incarceration effects in a general equilibrium model of crime," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 214-229, February.
  16. Thomas J. Miceli, 2008. "Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Repeat Offenders," Working papers 2008-44, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  17. Leshem Shmuel & Tabbach Avraham D., 2012. "Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-42, May.
  18. Arandjelović, Ognjen, 2023. "Crime & Punishment: A Rethink," OSF Preprints jsxcf, Center for Open Science.
  19. Miceli Thomas J., 2012. "Deterred or Detained? A Unified Model of Criminal Punishment," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, March.
  20. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Picard, Pierre, 2007. "Point-record driving licence and road safety: An economic approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 235-258, February.
  21. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1998. "On offense history and the theory of deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-324, September.
  22. Ann Dryden Witte & Robert Witt, 2001. "What We Spend and What We Get: Public and Private Provision of Crime Prevention," NBER Working Papers 8204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Miceli, Thomas J., 2010. "A model of criminal sanctions that incorporate both deterrence and incapacitation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 205-207, May.
  24. Huttunen, Kristiina & Pekkala Kerr, Sari & Mälkönen, Ville, 2014. "The Effect of Rehabilitative Punishments on Juvenile Crime and Labor Market Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 8403, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  25. D’Antoni, Massimo & Galbiati, Roberto, 2007. "A signaling theory of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 204-218.
  26. Volker Meier, 2001. "On Prison and Therapy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 47-56, July.
  27. Shavell, Steven, 2015. "A simple model of optimal deterrence and incapacitation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 13-19.
  28. Benzion Barlev & Haim Levy, 1996. "Misuse And Optimum Inspecting Strategy In Agency Problems," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 82-104, February.
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