On Prison and Therapy
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1011248528535
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- Meier, Volker, 2001. "On prison and therapy," Munich Reprints in Economics 19189, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Keywords
criminal law; optimal punishment;Statistics
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