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Can Unemployment Be Involuntary? Comment [Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device]

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wang, Cheng, 2011. "Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-110, January.
  2. Akiomi Kitagawa, 2014. "Wage Profiles and Income Inequality among Identical Workers: A Simple Formalization," DSSR Discussion Papers 23, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
  3. Alberto Bennardo & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2003. "Bertrand and Walras Equilibria under Moral Hazard," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(4), pages 785-817, August.
  4. Robert J. Barro, 1989. "New Classicals and Keynesians, or the Good Guys and the Bad Guys," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 125(III), pages 263-273, September.
  5. Harry J. Holzer & Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, 1988. "Job Queues and Wages: New Evidence on the Minimum Wage and Inter-Industry Wage Structure," Working Papers 610, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  6. Vincenzo Scoppa, 2003. "Contratti incompleti ed enforcement endogeno. Una rassegna della letteratura," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 391-440.
  7. Eizo Kawai, 2023. "Toward the rebuilding of modern macroeconomic theory: Market failure and Keynes' unemployment," Working Papers e186, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
  8. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1998. "Motivation and Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 388-411, June.
  9. Moen, Espen R. & Rosén, Åsa, 2003. "Equilibrium Incentive Contracts," Working Paper Series 3/2003, Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
  10. Wouter J. Den Haan & Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1999. "Contract-theoretic approaches to wages and displacement," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 55-68.
  11. Strand, J., 1998. "Bargaining Versus Efficiency Wages in a Dynamic Labor Market: A Synthesis," Memorandum 22/1998, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  12. Lin, Chung-Cheng & Yang, C. C., 2003. "Tournaments, minimum wage, and money non-neutrality," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 481-489, December.
  13. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  14. Lin, Chung-cheng, 2004. "Bonding, shirking and adverse selection," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 545-560, May.
  15. Wu, Steven Y., 2021. "Determinants of Relational Contract Performance: Experimental Evidence," 2021 Allied Social Sciences Association (ASSA) Annual Meeting (Virtual), January 3-5, 2021, San Diego, California 308455, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  16. Akiomi Kitagawa, 2013. "Long-run Consequences of Ranking Job Applicants by Unemployment Duration: Theoretical and Numerical Analyses," DSSR Discussion Papers 13, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
  17. Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2005. "Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19522, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  18. Mikael Priks, 2011. "Judiciaries in corrupt societies," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 75-88, March.
  19. William T. Dickens & Lawrence F. Katz & Kevin Lang, 1986. "Are Efficiency Wages Efficient?," NBER Working Papers 1935, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 1999. "Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 106-134, February.
  21. Nisvan Erkal & Steven Y. Wu & Brian E. Roe, 2022. "Correction to: Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 140-140, February.
  22. Campbell III, Carl M., 2006. "A model of the determinants of effort," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 215-237, March.
  23. Paul Hek & Daniel Vuuren, 2011. "Are older workers overpaid? A literature review," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(4), pages 436-460, August.
  24. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 1992. "Les contrats auto-exécutoires et la théorie des institutions du marché du travail," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 68(3), pages 433-451, septembre.
  25. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2007. "Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 595-628, September.
  26. Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, "undated". "Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions," IEW - Working Papers 038, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  27. George A. Akerlof, 2003. "Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 47(1), pages 25-47, March.
  28. Peter Skott, 2006. "Wage inequality and overeducation in a model with efficiency wages," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(1), pages 94-123, February.
  29. Thomas Zimmerfaust, 2018. "Are Workers Willing To Pay To Join A Better Team?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1278-1295, April.
  30. Mikael Priks, 2005. "Optimal Rent Extraction in Pre-Industrial England and France – Default Risk and Monitoring Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 1464, CESifo.
  31. Eizo Kawai, 2023. "Toward the rebuilding of modern macroeconomic theory: Market failure and Keynes' unemployment equilibrium," Working Papers e182, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
  32. Barro, Robert J, 1989. "An Efficiency-Wage Theory of the Weather," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 999-1001, August.
  33. Nisvan Erkal & Steven Y. Wu & Brian E. Roe, 2022. "Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 111-139, February.
  34. Engelhardt, Bryan & Rocheteau, Guillaume & Rupert, Peter, 2008. "Crime and the labor market: A search model with optimal contracts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1876-1891, October.
  35. James M. Malcomson & Sophocles Mavroeidis, 2007. "Matching Frictions, Efficiency Wages, and Unemployment in the USA and the UK," Working Papers 2007-02, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  36. Pablo González, 2002. "Profit Sharing Reconsidered: Efficiency Wages and Renegotiation Costs," Documentos de Trabajo 151, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  37. Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong & Lin, Chung-cheng, 2003. "Profit sharing, worker effort, and double-sided moral hazard in an efficiency wage model," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 75-93, March.
  38. Jon Strand, 2003. "Wage Bargaining Versus Efficiency Wages: A Synthesis," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, January.
  39. Jonathan R. Peterson, 2023. "Employee bonding and turnover efficiency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 223-244, January.
  40. Georgiadis, Andreas, 2008. "Efficiency wages and the economic effects of the minimum wage: evidence from a low-wage labour market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19628, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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