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Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Duffie, Darrell & Dworczak, Piotr, 2021. "Robust benchmark design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 775-802.
  2. Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_124, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  3. Debasis Mishra & Xu Lang, 2022. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Discussion Papers 22-03, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
  4. Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza, 2024. "Costly state verification with Limited Commitment," TSE Working Papers 24-1570, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  5. Ivan Balbuzanov, 2019. "Lies and consequences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1203-1240, December.
  6. Yingkai Li & Xiaoyun Qiu, 2023. "Screening Signal-Manipulating Agents via Contests," Papers 2302.09168, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  7. Pereyra, Juan Sebastián & Silva, Francisco, 2023. "Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
  8. Albin Erlanson & Andreas Kleiner, 2024. "Optimal allocations with capacity constrained verification," Papers 2409.02031, arXiv.org.
  9. Li, Yunan & Zhang, Xingtan, 2024. "Collective decision through an informed mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
  10. Markos Epitropou & Rakesh Vohra, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanisms with Verification," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  11. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2023. "Selecting a winner with external referees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
  12. Andrei Barbos, 2022. "Optimal contracts with random monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 119-154, March.
  13. Alireza Fallah & Michael I. Jordan, 2023. "Contract Design With Safety Inspections," Papers 2311.02537, arXiv.org.
  14. Xu Lang, 2022. "Reduced-Form Allocations with Complementarity: A 2-Person Case," Papers 2202.06245, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
  15. Erlanson, Albin & Kleiner, Andreas, 2019. "A note on optimal allocation with costly verification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 56-62.
  16. Lang, Xu & Mishra, Debasis, 2024. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
  17. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2020. "Optimal Quality Certification," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 161-176, June.
  18. Li, Yunan, 2020. "Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  19. Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," Papers 1908.05556, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
  20. Xu Lang, 2022. "Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 335-359, August.
  21. Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2020. "Project selection with partially verifiable information," Papers 2007.00907, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
  22. Yi-Chun Chen & Gaoji Hu & Xiangqian Yang, 2022. "Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification," Papers 2210.16001, arXiv.org.
  23. Erlanson, Albin & Kleiner, Andreas, 2020. "Costly verification in collective decisions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  24. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao & Suen, Wing, 2021. "Optimal delay in committees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 449-475.
  25. Chen, Jiakai, 2021. "LIBOR's poker," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
  26. Aaron Finkle & Dongsoo Shin, 2020. "Obstructive monitoring," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 873-891, October.
  27. Yunan Li, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Costly Verification and Limited Punishments, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Sep 2017.
  28. Xu Lang & Debasis Mishra, 2022. "Symmetric reduced form voting," Papers 2207.09253, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
  29. Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  30. Francisco Silva & Juan Pereyra, 2020. "Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation," Documentos de Trabajo 540, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
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