Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types
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References listed on IDEAS
- Wasser, Cédric, 2013.
"A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 180-182.
- Wasser, Cédric, 2010. "Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 331, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Cédric Wasser, 2013.
"Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 239-268, May.
- Wasser, Cédric, 2010. "Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 311, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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- Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2010. "Contests with private costs: Beyond two players," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 558-567, December.
- Mark Fey, 2008. "Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 225-236, June.
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Cited by:
- Zenou, Yves & Xu, Jin & Zhou, Junjie, 2019. "Networks in Conflict: A Variational Inequality Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 13647, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020.
"Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
- Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2013. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," ECON - Working Papers 133, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2018.
- Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2022. "On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
- Ori Haimanko, 2022.
"Equilibrium existence in two-player contests without absolute continuity of information,"
Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 27-39, May.
- Ori Haimanko, 2021. "Equilibrium Existence in Two-player Contests Without Absolute Continuity of Information," Working Papers 2106, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2016.
"Equilibrium existence in group contests,"
Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 265-276, October.
- Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2014. "Equilibrium existence in group contests," Working Papers wp2014_12_02, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
- Foster, Joshua & Haley, M. Ryan, 2022. "Charity auctions as assets: Theory and simulations of fundraising risk management in mean-variance space," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
- Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2017.
"Biased contests for symmetric players,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 116-144.
- Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2016. "Biased contests for symmetric players," MPRA Paper 75378, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jul 2023.
- Gallice, Andrea, 2017. "An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(2), pages 673-684.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Wu, Qinggong, 2018. "A simple model of competition between teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 372-392.
- Xu, Jin & Zenou, Yves & Zhou, Junjie, 2022. "Equilibrium characterization and shock propagation in conflict networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
- Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2023. "On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 348-362.
- Ksenia Shakhgildyan, 2023. "Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Contests with Uncertainty," Working Papers 690, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Ori Haimanko, 2021.
"Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence in (almost continuous) contests,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(3), pages 1231-1258, April.
- Ori Haimanko, 2020. "Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Existence In (Almost Continuous) Contests," Working Papers 2013, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Jinsoo Bae & John H. Kagel, 2022. "Selling shares to budget-constrained bidders: an experimental study of the proportional auction," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 8(1), pages 45-55, December.
- Einy, E. & Haimanko, O. & Moreno, D. & Sela, A. & Shitovitz, B., 2015. "Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 241-245.
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More about this item
Keywords
Rent-seeking; private information; pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; existence; uniqueness;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2014-06-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2014-06-02 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
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