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Control transfers in corporate Germany: their frequency, causes and consequences

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  • Köke, Jens

Abstract

This study examines changes in block ownership for a large sample of listed and non-listed German firms. The frequency of block trading is similar to other countries, and the vast majority of block trades leads to changes in ultimate ownership (control transfers). Such changes are more likely for firms with high leverage, while they are less likely for larger firms and firms with high ownership concentration. Only for listed firms poor performance is related to more frequent control transfers. Control transfers are followed by increased management turnover, and for listed firms also by asset divestitures and employee layoffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Köke, Jens, 2000. "Control transfers in corporate Germany: their frequency, causes and consequences," ZEW Discussion Papers 00-67, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5349
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24414/1/dp0067.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Frank A. Schmid & Mark Wahrenburg, 2002. "Mergers and acquisitions in Germany," Working Papers 2002-027, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    2. Axel Börsch‐Supan & Jens Köke, 2002. "An Applied Econometricians' View of Empirical Corporate Governance Studies," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(3), pages 295-326, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; ownership structure; management turnover; restructuring;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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