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Centralizing Tendencies in the Public Sector in Germany

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  • Stegarescu, Dan

Abstract

This paper investigates the long-term trend and the underlying determinants of public sector centralization in Germany from 1871 until today. The institutional and the quantitative review of the German history provides no conclusive evidence for a continuous process of government centralization as suggested by Popitz' "law", but rather for some distinct developments caused by the effects of wars and regime changes. Accordingly, whereas the role of the central government increased continuously at the expense of the state governments untilWorldWar II, after 1950 the state level regained importance. An empirical analysis for the period 1950 to 2001 reveals a signidicant decentralizing effect of per capita income growth, but provides no clear evidence for a causal relationship between economic and European integration and fiscal decentralization in the case of Germany.

Suggested Citation

  • Stegarescu, Dan, 2005. "Centralizing Tendencies in the Public Sector in Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-46, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:4272
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24138/1/dp0546.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ram, Rati, 1987. "Wagner's Hypothesis in Time-Series and Cross-section Perspectives:," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(2), pages 194-204, May.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    3. Charles Blankart, 2000. "The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 27-39, March.
    4. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, September.
    5. Stegarescu, Dan, 2004. "Public Sector Decentralization: Measurement Concepts and Recent International Trends," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-74, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Peltzman, Sam, 1980. "The Growth of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 209-287, October.
    7. Stegarescu, Dan, 2004. "Economic Integration and Fiscal Decentralization: Evidence from OECD Countries," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-86, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. Stegarescu, Dan & Büttner, Thiess & Behnisch, Alexej, 2002. "Public Sector Centralization and Productivity Growth: Reviewing the German Experience," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-03, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    9. Peltzman, Sam, 1980. "The Growth of Government," Working Papers 1, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Döring & Jan Schnellenbach, 2011. "A tale of two federalisms: Germany, the United States and the ubiquity of centralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 83-102, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Sector Centralization; Popitz' Law; Determinants of Centralization; Germany;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration

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