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Decline of CFC rules and rise of IP boxes: How the ECJ affects tax competition and economic distortions in Europe

Author

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  • Bräutigam, Rainer
  • Spengel, Christoph
  • Streif, Frank

Abstract

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has become an influential player in the field of direct taxation in the European Union in the past twenty years. However, it is unclear whether the ECJ's decisions actually increase tax neutrality and therefore contribute to the achievement of an internal market as stipulated by the European treaties or not. In 2006, the ECJ limited the applicability of specific tax rules in Europe that are intended to prohibit the excessive use of low-tax countries. Our counterfactual scenarios show that this restriction of so-called controlled foreign company (CFC) rules and the related emergence of IP boxes cast doubt on the positive effects the ECJ is assumed to have. Additionally, we show that the abolishment of IP boxes would strengthen tax neutrality in Europe. Overall, further research is needed to relate and harmonise economic and legal concepts of tax neutrality.

Suggested Citation

  • Bräutigam, Rainer & Spengel, Christoph & Streif, Frank, 2015. "Decline of CFC rules and rise of IP boxes: How the ECJ affects tax competition and economic distortions in Europe," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:15055
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Annette Alstadsæter & Salvador Barrios & Gaetan Nicodeme & Agnieszka Maria Skonieczna & Antonio Vezzani, 2018. "Patent boxes design, patents location, and local R&D," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 33(93), pages 131-177.
    2. Schwab, Thomas & Todtenhaupt, Maximilian, 2016. "Spillover from the haven: Cross-border externalities of patent box regimes within multinational firms," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-073, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    3. Michael Overesch & Sabine Schenkelberg & Georg Wamser, 2018. "Do US Firms Pay Less Tax than their European Peers? On Firm Characteristics, Profit Shifting Opportunities, and Tax Legislation as Determinants of Tax Differentials," CESifo Working Paper Series 6960, CESifo.
    4. Spengel, Christoph & Heckemeyer, Jost Henrich & Streif, Frank, 2016. "The effect of inflation and interest rates on forward-looking effective tax rates," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, volume 63, number 148154.
    5. Sabine Schenkelberg, 2020. "The Cadbury Schweppes judgment and its implications on profit shifting activities within Europe," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(1), pages 1-31, February.
    6. Spengel, Christoph & Heckemeyer, Jost Henrich & Nusser, Hannah & Klar, Oliver & Streif, Frank, 2016. "The impact of tax planning on forward-looking effective tax rates," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, volume 64, number 148155.
    7. Wolfram F. Richter, 2017. "Taxing Intellectual Property in the Global Economy: A Plea for Regulated and Internationally Coordinated Profit Splitting," CESifo Working Paper Series 6564, CESifo.
    8. Richter, Wolfram F. & Breuer, Markus, 2016. "Pricing the Transfer of Intellectual Property: A Plea for Regulated and Internationally Coordinated Profit Splitting," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145621, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Court of Justice; Tax Neutrality; Effective Tax Rates; Controlled Foreign Company Rules; Intellectual Property Boxes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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