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Regierungsstabilität in Osteuropa: Der Einfluss von Parlamenten und Parteien

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  • Harfst, Philipp

Abstract

Da die Stabilität einer Regierung eine der Voraussetzungen ihrer Effektivität ist und gerade mittelosteuropäische Regierungen mit einem beachtlichen Problemdruck konfrontiert waren und sind, kommt der Regierungsstabilität in dieser Region eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Dieses Papier analysiert die Bedingungen stabiler Regierungen auf der Grundlage institutioneller Regelsysteme sowie Charakteristika des Parteiensystems. Grundlage der Untersuchung sind 76 Regierungen in 16 osteuropäischen Mitgliedsstaaten des Europarats bis Januar 1999. Die Analyse ergibt, dass sowohl institutionelle Regelsysteme wie auch die Zahl der im Parlament vertretenen Parteien einen messbaren Einfluss auf die Stabilität einer Regierung haben: Einerseits lässt sich mit Hilfe der institutionellen Regeln zu Investitur, Parlamentsauflösung und Misstrauensvoten das Instabilitätsrisiko einer Regierung bestimmen, andererseits sind vor allem fragmentierte Parteiensysteme nicht in der Lage, stabile Regierungen hervorzubringen.

Suggested Citation

  • Harfst, Philipp, 2001. "Regierungsstabilität in Osteuropa: Der Einfluss von Parlamenten und Parteien," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions and Social Change FS III 01-204, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbisc:fsiii01204
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