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Instrumental calculation, cognitive role-playing, or both? Self-perceptions of Seconded National Experts in the European Commission

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  • Murdoch, Zuzana
  • Geys, Benny

Abstract

Most work studying micro-processes of integration - i.e. how agents develop identities and decision-making behaviours within a particular institution - offers explanations based on either instrumental rationality or socialisation. This article proposes a twodimensional framework that allows analysing under which conditions both logics of social action co-exist. Our empirical analysis employs a unique dataset from a 2011 survey of all 1098 currently active Seconded National Experts (SNEs) in the European Commission, and is supportive the model's theoretical predictions. We find that a) instrumental cost-benefit calculation and cognitive role-playing (as semi-reflexive socialisation) often simultaneously influence SNEs' (perceptions of their) behaviour, and b) this joint presence of both logics of social action depends on certain scope conditions (i.e., SNEs' education, length of prior embeddedness and noviceness).

Suggested Citation

  • Murdoch, Zuzana & Geys, Benny, 2011. "Instrumental calculation, cognitive role-playing, or both? Self-perceptions of Seconded National Experts in the European Commission," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-110, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011110
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Liesbet Hooghe, 2012. "Images of Europe: How Commission Officials Conceive Their Institution's Role," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 87-111, January.
    2. Hooghe, Liesbet, 2005. "Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 861-898, October.
    3. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 769-798.
    4. Thomas Leonard, 2008. "Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 356-360, December.
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    1. Murdoch, Zuzana & Trondal, Jarle, 2012. "Contracted government: Unveiling the European Commission's contracted staff," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-106, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

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