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Compliance-Regulierung aus ökonomischer Perspektive

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  • Schenkel, Andreas

Abstract

Die Angemessenheit von Bankenregulierung wird aktuell in Wissenschaft und Praxis intensiv diskutiert. Bankwirtschaftliche ComplianceVorgaben sind dabei ein wichtiger Bestandteil der Debatte und rücken zunehmend in den Vordergrund. Viele kleine und mittlere Banken, zu denen auch viele Genossenschaftsbanken gehören, befürchten, dass die Anforderungen an die Compliance-Funktion und die Berücksichtigung von Compliance-Risiken nur mit Blick auf Bankkonzerne entwickelt wurden. Es wird angezweifelt, dass für kleine Banken die Beurteilung der Angemessenheit des Verhältnisses von Kosten zu Nutzen zu einem ähnlichen Ergebnis führt wie bei Großbanken. Compliance-Vorgaben für Regionalbanken seien demnach ein ungerechtfertigter Markteingriff. Das vorliegende Arbeitspapier untersucht, in wie weit aus ökonomischer Perspektive die Compliance-Regulierung einen gerechtfertigten Eingriff darstellt. Erstmalig wird der Compliance-Bereich ganzheitlich betrachtet und mögliche Ansatzpunkte identifiziert, die für eine geringere Regulierungsintensität bei kleinen Banken sprechen könnten.

Suggested Citation

  • Schenkel, Andreas, 2016. "Compliance-Regulierung aus ökonomischer Perspektive," Arbeitspapiere 168, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wwuifg:168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Schenkel, Andreas, 2015. "Bankenregulierung und Bürokratiekosten: Ein Problemaufriss," Arbeitspapiere 152, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
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    6. Oecd, 2010. "Policy framework for effective and efficient financial regulation: General guidance and high-level checklist," OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2009(2), pages 267-321.
    7. Grant Kirkpatrick, 2009. "The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis," OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2009(1), pages 61-87.
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    1. Schenkel, Andreas, 2016. "Kosten der Compliance-Regulierung: Eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel der deutschen Genossenschaftsbanken," Arbeitspapiere 169, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.

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