IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/vfsc17/168231.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

(Un-)Stable Preferences, Beliefs, and the Predictability of Behaviour

Author

Listed:
  • Wolff, Irenaeus

Abstract

I show that whether participants generally believe in others’ preference stability is a crucial determinant of behaviour. Whether a participant’s behaviour can be predicted by her best-response or a Nash-equilibrium in a context where she can observe others' elicited preferences depends heavily both on the participant having stable preferences and on her generally believing in others’ preference stability. The latter is true because such a belief is associated with less dispersed beliefs.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolff, Irenaeus, 2017. "(Un-)Stable Preferences, Beliefs, and the Predictability of Behaviour," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168231, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168231
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168231/1/VfS-2017-pid-3330.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Irenaeus Wolff, 2013. "When best-replies are not in Equilibrium: Understanding Cooperative Behaviour," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-28, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    2. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2017. "What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 83-85.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2022. "Predicting Voluntary Contributions by `Revealed-Preference Nash-Equilibrium'," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264072, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Dominik Bauer & Irenaeus Wolff, 2018. "Biases in Beliefs: Experimental Evidence," TWI Research Paper Series 109, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    3. Irenaeus Wolff, 2016. "What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?," TWI Research Paper Series 105, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    4. Folli, Dominik & Wolff, Irenaeus, 2022. "Biases in belief reports," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    5. Aurélie Dariel, 2018. "Conditional Cooperation and Framing Effects," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-12, June.
    6. Eugen Dimant & Michele Gelfand & Anna Hochleitner & Silvia Sonderegger, 2022. "Strategic Behavior with Tight, Loose and Polarized Norms," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 198, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    7. Brunner, Christoph & Kauffeldt, T. Florian & Rau, Hannes, 2017. "Does mutual knowledge of preferences lead to more equilibrium play? Experimental evidence," Working Papers 0629, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    8. Bauer, Dominik & Wolff, Irenaeus, 2019. "Biases in Beliefs," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203601, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    9. Edward Cartwright, 2019. "Guilt Aversion and Reciprocity in the Performance-Enhancing Drug Game," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(4), pages 535-555, May.
    10. Wolff, Irenaeus, 2017. "What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 83-85.
    11. Eugen Dimant & Michele Gelfand & Anna Hochleitner & Silvia Sonderegger, 2023. "Strategic Behavior with Tight, Loose and Polarized Norms," CESifo Working Paper Series 10233, CESifo.
    12. Brunner, Christoph & Kauffeldt, T. Florian & Rau, Hannes, 2021. "Does mutual knowledge of preferences lead to more Nash equilibrium play? Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168231. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfsocea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.