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On The Ambiguous Sign of the Optimal Utilitarian Marginal Income Tax

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  • Hansen, Emanuel

Abstract

The paper studies optimal income taxation in a model with labor supply responses at the intensive and the extensive margin. It is shown that a utilitarian desire for redistribution does not pin down the sign of the optimal marginal tax rate: labor supply may be downward distorted, undistorted, or even upward distorted at both margins. The paper provides suffi cient conditions for the optimality of an EITC-style tax/transfer scheme under which labor supply is upward distorted at both margins for some skill groups. Furthermore, the paper shows optimal upward distortions at the intensive margin are driven by a non-standard tradeoff between effi ciency at the intensive margin and effi ciency at the extensive margin.

Suggested Citation

  • Hansen, Emanuel, 2014. "On The Ambiguous Sign of the Optimal Utilitarian Marginal Income Tax," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100435, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100435
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Paul Beaudry & Charles Blackorby & Dezsö Szalay, 2009. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 216-242, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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