Could we overcome the Winner's Curse by (behavioral) auction design?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
- Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000604, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2006. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Vincent P Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000001005, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Crawford, Vincent P. & Iriberri, Nagore, 2005. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt12586197, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1986. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 894-920, December.
- Vlad Mares & Ronald Harstad, 2007.
"Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 399-410, August.
- Ronald M. Harstad & Vlad Mares, 2005. "Ex-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly," Working Papers 0515, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
- Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2011. "Out‐Of‐Equilibrium Bids in First‐Price Auctions: Wrong Expectations or Wrong Bids," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(557), pages 1361-1397, December.
- Lind, Barry & Plott, Charles R, 1991.
"The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 335-346, March.
- Lind, Barry & Plott, Charles., 1989. "The Winner's Curse: Experiments with Buyers and with Sellers," Working Papers 699, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Koch, Christian & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2018. "The winner's curse: Conditional reasoning and belief formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 57-102.
- Freeman, David J. & Kimbrough, Erik O. & Reiss, J. Philipp, 2020.
"Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder’s curse,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
- Freeman, David & Kimbrough, Erik O. & Reiss, J. Philipp, 2017. "Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder's curse," Working Paper Series in Economics 101, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
- David Freeman & Erik O. Kimbrough & J. Philipp Reiss, 2017. "Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder's curse," Discussion Papers dp17-04, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Koch, Christian & Penczynski, Stefan P., 2018. "The winner's curse: Conditional reasoning and belief formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 57-102.
- Wei-Shiun Chang & Bo Chen & Timothy C. Salmon, 2015. "An Investigation of the Average Bid Mechanism for Procurement Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(6), pages 1237-1254, June.
- Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, 2010.
"Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(4), pages 1435-1452, July.
- Asen Ivanov & Dan Levin & Muriel Niederle, "undated". "Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner’s Curse?: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0803, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Penalver, Adrian & Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Akiyama, Eizo & Funaki, Yukihiko & Ishikawa, Ryuichiro, 2020.
"A quantitative easing experiment,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
- A. Penalver & N. Hanaki & E. Akiyama & Y. Funaki & R. Ishikawa, 2017. "A Quantitative Easing Experiment," Working papers 651, Banque de France.
- Adrian Penalver & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Eizo Akiyama & Yukihiko Funaki, 2020. "A quantitative easing experiment," ISER Discussion Paper 1094, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Adrian Penalver & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Eizo Akiyama & Yukihiko Funaki & Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2018. "A Quantitative Easing Experiment," GREDEG Working Papers 2018-10, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Choi, Syngjoo & Guerra, José-Alberto & Kim, Jinwoo, 2019.
"Interdependent value auctions with insider information: Theory and experiment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 218-237.
- Syngjoo Choi & Jos¢¥e-Alberto Guerra & Jinwoo Kim, 2018. "Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Information: Theory and Experiment," Working Paper Series no114, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
- Cox, Caleb, 2014. "Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods," MPRA Paper 53074, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sascha Füllbrunn & Tibor Neugebauer, 2013.
"Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 421-447, September.
- Tibor Neugebauer & Sascha F llbrunn, 2013. "Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game," LSF Research Working Paper Series 13-10, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
- Moser, Johannes, 2018. "Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181506, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Grosskopf, Brit & Rentschler, Lucas & Sarin, Rajiv, 2018. "An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 40-64.
- Johannes Moser, 2017. "Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation," Working Papers 176, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
- Moser, Johannes, 2017. "Hypothetical thinking and the winner's curse: An experimental investigation," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems 36304, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
- Ulrich Bergmann & Arkady Konovalov, 2024. "Auction design and order of sale with budget-constrained bidders," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(1), pages 36-57, March.
- Johannes Moser, 2019. "Hypothetical thinking and the winner’s curse: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(1), pages 17-56, July.
- Philippe Gillen & Alexander Rasch & Achim Wambach & Peter Werner, 2016. "Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 511-534, November.
- Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2019. "Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1001-1031, December.
- Cox, Caleb A., 2015. "Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 52-65.
- Quement, Mark T. Le & Marcin, Isabel, 2020. "Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 449-468.
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Seres, Gyula, 2021.
"Are strategies anchored?,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Seres, Gyula, 2019. "Are Strategies Anchored?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 211, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2024.
"Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 371-405, November.
- Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2019. "Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments," NBER Working Papers 25918, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2019. "Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers 2019-22, Princeton University. Economics Department..
More about this item
JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2014-02-02 (Experimental Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79926. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfsocea.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.