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Licensing with Free Entry

Author

Listed:
  • Muthers, Johannes
  • Inceoglu, Firat
  • Doganoglu, Toker

Abstract

The literature on the licensing of an innovation has mainly focused on some speci c contract types. We show within the framework of a fairly general model that removing these contractual limitations will lead to extreme market outcomes. Speci cally, we nd that when the patentee can employ observable contracts that can condition on market entry, it can achieve the monopoly outcome. Furthermore, when the patentee can only use unconditional quantity forcing contracts, it captures the entire market, albeit not at monopoly price, via a single licensee. Our results point out to the signi cance, and perhaps the particularity, of observable, nonrenegotiable contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Muthers, Johannes & Inceoglu, Firat & Doganoglu, Toker, 2013. "Licensing with Free Entry," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79757, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79757
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. San Martín, Marta & Saracho, Ana I., 2010. "Royalty licensing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 284-287, May.
    2. Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2007. "General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 163-186, April.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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