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Die Theorie mehrseitiger Marktplätze in der US-amerikanischen und deutschen Zusammenschlusskontrollle: Eine empirische Untersuchung für den Mediensektor

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  • Dittmann, Heidi
  • Kuchinke, Björn

Abstract

Die Theorie mehrseitiger Marktplätze hat sich seit den ersten Arbeiten von Rochet/Tirole (2003), Evans (2003) und Evans/Schmalensee (2007) und ihrer Übertragung auf Medienmärkte durch Dewenter (2006) und Dewenter/Haucap (2009) zur Analyse von Plattformmärkten im wissenschaftlichen Diskurs inzwischen etabliert. Die Würdigung der plattformspezifischen Besonderheiten war bisher weder im US-amerikanischen noch im deutschen Kartellrecht verpflichtend vorgegeben. Mit der 9. GWB-Novelle wurden diese erstmalig in das deutsche Kartellrecht aufgenommen. Vor dem Hintergrund der aufgezeigten Gefahren bei der Vernachlässigung dieser besteht das Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags in der Untersuchung der praktischen Relevanz der theoretischen Erkenntnisse in der Zusammenschlussprüfung der US-amerikanischen und deutschen Kartellbehörden.

Suggested Citation

  • Dittmann, Heidi & Kuchinke, Björn, 2020. "Die Theorie mehrseitiger Marktplätze in der US-amerikanischen und deutschen Zusammenschlusskontrollle: Eine empirische Untersuchung für den Mediensektor," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 136, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:136
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lapo Filistrucchi, 2008. "A SSNIP test for two-sided markets: the case of media," Working Papers 08-34, NET Institute, revised Oct 2008.
    2. Erich Emch & T. Scott Thompson, 2006. "Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks," EAG Discussions Papers 200609, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    3. Emch Eric & Thompson T. Scott, 2006. "Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-16, March.
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