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Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing

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  • Michael L. Katz

Abstract

Although the economics of multisided platforms has developed important insights for antitrust policy, there are critical respects in which the body of academic knowledge falls short of providing useful advice to enforcement agencies and the courts. Indeed, there is a substantial risk that recent scholarship will be misapplied to the detriment of sound antitrust policy, as evidenced by the US Supreme Court's recent decision in American Express. In this note, I identify several areas in which economics research could potentially make significant contributions to the practical antitrust treatment of platforms.

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  • Michael L. Katz, 2019. "Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 138-152, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:28:y:2019:i:1:p:138-152
    DOI: 10.1111/jems.12304
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    Cited by:

    1. Tan, Hongru & Wright, Julian, 2021. "Pricing distortions in multi-sided platforms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    2. Alleman, James & Baranes, Edmond & Rappoport, Paul, 2019. "Multisided Markets & Platform Dominance," 30th European Regional ITS Conference, Helsinki 2019 205162, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    3. Maria Rosa Battaggion & Luke Garrod & Monica Giulietti & Luca Grilli, 2023. "Emerging challenges in competition policy and regulation," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 50(2), pages 221-225, June.
    4. Fuyuki Saruta, 2022. "Exclusive Contracts and Multihoming Agents in Two-sided Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2022-26, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    5. Lehr, William & Clark, David & Bauer, Steve, 2019. "Regulation when platforms are layered," 30th European Regional ITS Conference, Helsinki 2019 205193, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    6. Juan Manuel Sanchez‐Cartas & Gonzalo León, 2021. "Multisided Platforms And Markets: A Survey Of The Theoretical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 452-487, April.
    7. Michael L. Katz, 2019. "Multisided Platforms, Big Data, and a Little Antitrust Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(4), pages 695-716, June.
    8. Ding, Rong & Ko, Chiu Yu & Shen, Bo, 2022. "Partial compatibility in two-sided markets: Equilibrium and welfare analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    9. Min Liu & Sajid Anwar, 2023. "Can price discrimination improve the performance of online retail platforms?," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 257-271, June.
    10. Saruta, Fuyuki, 2021. "Exclusive contracts and multihoming agents in two-sided markets," MPRA Paper 110070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Takanori ADACHI & Mark J. TREMBLAY, 2022. "Do No-Surcharge Rules Increase Effective Retail Prices?," Discussion papers e-22-003, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

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