IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/tuedps/14.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Strategische Verpflichtungen in einem mehrstufigen Oligopolmodell: Die (zeitliche) strategische Interdependenz oligopolischer Preis- und Werbeentscheidungen

Author

Listed:
  • Walz, Uwe
  • Wellisch, Dietmar

Abstract

In diesem Aufsatz wird im Rahmen eines dynamischen spieltheoretischen Oligopolmodells die gewinnoptimale Preis- und Werbeentscheidung untersucht. Diese Entscheidungen sind strategisch miteinander verknüpft. In der ersten Spielstufe werden unter Berücksichtigung der Auswirkung auf das nachfolgende Preisspiel die optimalen Werbestrategien festgelegt. Es zeigt sich, daß im symmetrischen Modell dem Marktverhalten der Unternehmen bei der Preisfestsetzung eine entscheidende Rolle für die Höhe der Werbeausgaben zukommt. Je wettbewerbsintensiver das Preisspiel gestaltet ist, desto höher sind die optimalen Werbeaufwendungen. Im Asymmetriefall wird gezeigt, daß die Investition in Werbung (Aufbau eines "goodwills" ) zur Verhinderung des Marktzutritts dienen kann. Je nach strategischer Variable in der zweiten Spielstufe kommt es im Zuge der Marktzutrittsverhinderungsstrategie zu exzessiven bzw. zu unteroptimalen Werbeaufwendungen.

Suggested Citation

  • Walz, Uwe & Wellisch, Dietmar, 1991. "Strategische Verpflichtungen in einem mehrstufigen Oligopolmodell: Die (zeitliche) strategische Interdependenz oligopolischer Preis- und Werbeentscheidungen," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 14, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:14
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/104868/1/tdb014.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406.
    2. A. M. Spence, 1981. "The Learning Curve and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 49-70, Spring.
    3. Brander, James A. & Lewis, Tracy R., 1986. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 956-970, December.
    4. Seade, Jesus K, 1980. "On the Effects of Entry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 479-489, March.
    5. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 225-235, Spring.
    6. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-122, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Claude d'Aspremont & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2007. "Competition For Market Share Or For Market Size: Oligopolistic Equilibria With Varying Competitive Toughness," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 761-784, August.
    2. Hong Hwang & Chao‐cheng Mai, 1999. "Optimal Export Taxes with an Endogenous Location," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(4), pages 940-952, April.
    3. Holloway, Garth J., 1995. "Conjectural Variations With Fewer Apologies," Working Papers 225880, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    4. Bernstein, Fernando & Federgruen, Awi, 2004. "Comparative statics, strategic complements and substitutes in oligopolies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 713-746, September.
    5. Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 505-533, May.
    6. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1986. "International Oligopoly and Asymmetric Labour Market Institutions," NBER Working Papers 2038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. McCorriston, Steve & Sheldon, Ian, 1990. "Foreign Subsidies, Dumping and Optimal Trade Policies: The Case of the UK Fertiliser Market," Occasional Papers 233052, Regional Research Project NC-194: Organization and Performance of World Food Systems.
    8. Spencer, Barbara J., 1988. "Capital subsidies and countervailing duties in oligopolistic industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 45-69, August.
    9. Neary, J Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2000. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 484-508, April.
    10. Holloway, Garth J., 1992. "The Representative Firm, Endogenous Output Decisions And Consistent Conjectural Variations In Oligopoly," Working Papers 225876, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    11. Federico Etro, 2014. "The Theory Of Endogenous Market Structures," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 804-830, December.
    12. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Marquez, Robert, 2007. "Stakeholder capitalism, corporate governance and firm value," CFS Working Paper Series 2007/26, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    13. Marc Escrihuela-Villar, 2008. "Innovation And Market Concentration With Asymmetric Firms," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 195-207.
    14. Sajal Lahiri & Peri Silva, 2016. "Potential Pareto-Improving Move Toward Most Favored Nation Tariffs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 1086-1104, April.
    15. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 707-722.
    16. Sheldon, Ian M., 1991. "Imperfect Competition and International Trade: The Use of Simulation Techniques," Occasional Papers 233066, Regional Research Project NC-194: Organization and Performance of World Food Systems.
    17. Jo, Seung-gyu & den Butter, Frank A. G., 2009. "Pros and Cons of Backing Winners in Innovation Policy," MPRA Paper 17658, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Emanuele Gerratana & Levent Koçkesen, 2015. "Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(3), pages 173-209, September.
    19. J. Peter Neary & Paul O'Sullivan, 1999. "Beat 'em or Join 'em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(4), pages 577-596, December.
    20. Dermot Leahy & J. Peter Neary, 2021. "When the threat is stronger than the execution: trade and welfare under oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(3), pages 471-495, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/wftuede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.