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A theory of intermediation in supply chains based on inventory control

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  • Qu, Zhan
  • Raff, Horst
  • Schmitt, Nicolas

Abstract

The paper shows that taking inventory control out of the hands of retailers and assigning it to an intermediary increases the value of a supply chain when demand volatility is high. This is because an intermediary can help solve two incentive problems associated with retailers' inventory control and thereby improve the intertemporal allocation of inventory. Adding an intermediary as a new link in a supply chain is also shown to reduce total inventory, to make shipments from the manufacturer less frequent and more variable in size, as well as to reduce social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Qu, Zhan & Raff, Horst & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2016. "A theory of intermediation in supply chains based on inventory control," CEPIE Working Papers 09/16, Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tudcep:0916
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kropf, Andreas & Sauré, Philip, 2014. "Fixed costs per shipment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 166-184.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Intermediation; Inventory; Demand Volatility; Supply Chain;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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