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The optimal industry structure in a vertically related market

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  • Fiocco, Raffaele

Abstract

We consider a vertically related market characterized by downstream imperfect competition and by the monopolistic provision of an essential facility-based input, whose price is set by a social-welfare maximizing regulator. Our model shows that the regulatory knowledge about the cost for providing the monopolistic input crucially affects the design of the optimal industry structure. In particular, we compare ownership separation, which prevents a single company from having the control of both upstream and downstream operations, and legal separation, under which these activities are legally unbundled but common ownership is allowed. As long as the regulator has full information, the two industry patterns yield the same social welfare level. However, under asymmetric information about the input costs legal separation can make the whole society better off.

Suggested Citation

  • Fiocco, Raffaele, 2010. "The optimal industry structure in a vertically related market," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-024, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2010-024
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    1. Basteck, Christian & Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Heinemann, Frank, 2013. "Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2620-2637.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    access charge; legal separation; ownership separation; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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