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The welfare enhancing effects of a selfish government in the presence of uninsurable, idiosyncratic risk

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  • Braun, R. Anton
  • Uhlig, Harald

Abstract

This paper poses the following question: Is it possible to improve welfare by increasing taxes and throwing away the revenues? This paper demonstrates that the answer to this question is yes. We show that there may be welfare gains from taxing capital income even when the additional capital income tax revenues are wasted or consumed by a selfish government. Previous literature has assumed that government expenditures are exogenous or productive, or allowed for redistribution of tax revenue either via lump-sum transfers, unemployment compensation or other redistributive schemes. In our model a selfish government taxes capital above a given threshold and then consumes the proceeds. This raises the before-tax real return on capital and and thereby enhances the ability of agents to self-insure when they are long-term unemployed and have low savings. Since all agents have positive probability of finding themselves in that state there are cases where all agents prefer a selfish government to no government at all.

Suggested Citation

  • Braun, R. Anton & Uhlig, Harald, 2006. "The welfare enhancing effects of a selfish government in the presence of uninsurable, idiosyncratic risk," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-070, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb649:sfb649dp2006-070
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Trabandt, Mathias & Uhlig, Harald, 2006. "How far are we from the slippery slope? The Laffer curve revisited," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-023, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    2. Trabandt, Mathias & Uhlig, Harald, 2011. "The Laffer curve revisited," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 305-327.
    3. Kaiji Chen & Ayşe İmrohoroğlu, 2017. "Debt in the US economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(4), pages 675-706, December.
    4. Nutahara, Kengo, 2015. "Laffer curves in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 56-72.
    5. John C. Stevenson, 2024. "Death, Taxes, and Inequality. Can a Minimal Model Explain Real Economic Inequality?," Papers 2406.13789, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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