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What are the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case?

Author

Listed:
  • Langenbucher, Katja
  • Leuz, Christian
  • Krahnen, Jan Pieter
  • Pelizzon, Loriana

Abstract

The paper discusses the policy implications of the Wirecard scandal. The study finds that all lines of defense against corporate fraud, including internal control systems, external audits, the oversight bodies for financial reporting and auditing and the market supervisor, contributed to the scandal and are in need of reform. To ensure market integrity and investor protection in the future, the authors make eight suggestions for the market and institutional oversight architecture in Germany and in Europe.

Suggested Citation

  • Langenbucher, Katja & Leuz, Christian & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Pelizzon, Loriana, 2020. "What are the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case?," SAFE White Paper Series 74, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:74
    DOI: 10.2861/936827
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kaufhold, Ann-Katrin & Langenbucher, Katja & Blank, Patrick & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2021. "BaFin (in)dependence - a reform proposal," SAFE White Paper Series 82, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    2. Christian Haddad & Lars Hornuf, 2021. "The Impact of Fintech Startups on Financial Institutions' Performance and Default Risk," CESifo Working Paper Series 9050, CESifo.
    3. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Nyreröd, Theo, 2021. "Surprised by Wirecard? Enablers of Corporate Wrongdoing in Europe," SITE Working Paper Series 54, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.

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