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The regulation of repo markets: Incorporating public interest through a stronger role of civil society

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  • Thiemann, Matthias
  • Birk, Marius

Abstract

Regulatory failures, which came to the fore after the financial crisis of 2007-2009, lead to the question of why some activities by financial institutions were not regulated prior to the crisis of 2007, even though regulators knew about certain dangers to financial stability? The repo-market, although centrally involved in the last crisis, still awaits stringent regulation. At the same time, the regulatory cycle seems to come to an end, boding ill for future crises which will be amplified by this market. In this situation, NGOs are needed to make regulators act upon their knowledge and to tighten their regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Thiemann, Matthias & Birk, Marius, 2015. "The regulation of repo markets: Incorporating public interest through a stronger role of civil society," SAFE White Paper Series 25, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:safewh:25
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Weijie Pang & Stephan Sturm, 2020. "XVA Valuation under Market Illiquidity," Papers 2011.03543, arXiv.org.

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    Keywords

    Repo Markets; Shadow Banking; Non-governmental Organizations;
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