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The impact of internet penetration on corporate income tax filing in South Africa

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  • Lediga, Collen

Abstract

Tax administrations around the world have introduced e-filing of tax returns due to its potential to improve tax return filing compliance. The introduction of this service for businesses in South Africa has not yielded the expected results. Drawing on tax administrative data on tax return filing and population census data, the study aims at determining whether internet access in the country, could have contributed to the less impact of the introduced administrative intervention. Accounting for specific characteristics of the areas in the country, and geoclassication (urban or rural area), we find that an increase in the fraction of household areas with internet access by 10 percentage points, raises the fraction of businesses that do submit a tax return by 1.86 percentage points. The results of the analysis highlights that the impact of the introduction of e-filing services for tax returns submission, is dependent on the internet coverage of the area.

Suggested Citation

  • Lediga, Collen, 2020. "The impact of internet penetration on corporate income tax filing in South Africa," Ruhr Economic Papers 861, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:861
    DOI: 10.4419/86788998
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate taxation; e-filing; less developed countries; tax administration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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