IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/roswps/27.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Soziale Dienste und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht - Die freie Wohlfahrtspflege zwischen nationalstaatlicher Souveränität in der Sozialpolitik und europäischem Wettbewerb im Dienstleistungsbereich

Author

Listed:
  • Eckardt, Martina

Abstract

Obwohl die Kompetenz zur Ausgestaltung ihrer sozialen Sicherungssysteme nach wie vor bei den Mitgliedstaaten der europäischen Union liegt, wendet der Europäische Gerichtshof seiner bisherigen Tradition folgend das europäische Gemeinschaftsrecht zunehmend auch auf die wirtschaftliche Seite sozialer Leistungen an. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die ökonomischen Konsequenzen, die sich daraus für die freie Wohlfahrtspflege und den Markt für soziale Dienste in Deutschland ergeben könnten. Das Resultat wäre eine Unterstützung der in den vergangenen Jahren eingeleiteten Reformmaßnahmen dieses Sektors, wobei eine darüber hinausgehende umfassende Deregulierung nicht zu erwarten ist. In der Folge stellt sich jedoch die Frage nach der adäquaten Kompetenzverteilung zwischen nationaler und europäischer Ebene erneut, um eine stillschweigende Verlagerung von Zuständigkeiten zu verhindern.

Suggested Citation

  • Eckardt, Martina, 2000. "Soziale Dienste und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht - Die freie Wohlfahrtspflege zwischen nationalstaatlicher Souveränität in der Sozialpolitik und europäischem Wettbewerb im Dienstleistungsbereich," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 27, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:roswps:27
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/78281/1/wp027thuenen.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard A. Easterlin, 1992. "Analysis," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(4), pages 51-53, July.
    2. Vanberg Viktor, 1993. "Constitutionally Constrained and Safeguarded Competition in Markets and Politics with reference to a European Constitution," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 3-28, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martinez, Richard J. & Norman, Patricia M., 2004. "Whither reputation? The effects of different stakeholders," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 25-32.
    2. Peter Van Wijck & Ben Van Velthoven, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of the American and the Continental Rule for Allocating Legal Costs," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 115-125, March.
    3. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
    4. Sabatini, Fabio, 2008. "Does Social Capital Mitigate Precariousness?," MPRA Paper 6639, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Bruno Deffains & Marie Obidzinski, 2009. "Real Options Theory for Law Makers," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 75(1), pages 93-117.
    6. Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2008. "Judicial Errors, Legal Standards and Innovative Activity," CSEF Working Papers 196, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 04 Jun 2010.
    7. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    8. Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2004. "The Communicative Character of Capitalistic Competition: A Hayekian response to the Habermasian challenge," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 04/1, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    9. Alankar, Ashwin & Blausten, Peter & Scholes, Myron S., 2013. "The Cost of Constraints: Risk Management, Agency Theory and Asset Prices," Research Papers 2135, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    10. Immordino, Giovanni & Pagano, Marco & Polo, Michele, 2011. "Incentives to innovate and social harm: Laissez-faire, authorization or penalties?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 864-876.
    11. Lucas, Andre & van Dijk, Ronald & Kloek, Teun, 2002. "Stock selection, style rotation, and risk," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-34, January.
    12. Roland Vaubel, 1999. "Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 327-338, November.
    13. Mike, Károly, 2015. "Kevesebb vagy több közgazdaságtant?. Valentiny Pál-Kiss Ferenc László-Nagy Csongor István (szerk.): Verseny és szabályozás, 2013. MTA KRTK KTI, Budapest, 2014, 372 o [More or less economics?. Pál V," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(3), pages 335-340.
    14. Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2011. "Optimal Legal Standards in Antitrust: Traditional v. Innovative Industries," Working Papers 420, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    15. Toshiki Honda, 2013. "Risk and Return in Japanese Equity Market," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 9(3), pages 515-530, September.
    16. Bob Korkie & Harry J. Turtle, 2002. "A Mean-Variance Analysis of Self-Financing Portfolios," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(3), pages 427-443, March.
    17. Ann L. Brower & Philip Meguire & Adrian Monks, 2010. "Closing the Deal: Principals, Agents, and Subagents in New Zealand Land Reform," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 86(3).
    18. Christine Jolls, 2007. "Behavioral Law and Economics," NBER Working Papers 12879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    20. Samuel A. Rea, Jr., 1995. "Breaking Up is Hard to Do: The Economics of Spousal Support," Working Papers reas-95-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sozialpolitik; Wettbewerbspolitik;

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:roswps:27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ivrosde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.