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Dealing government bonds: Trading infrastructures and infrastructural power in European markets for public debt

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  • van der Heide, Arjen

Abstract

Confronted with increased difficulties to raise taxation, high inflation, and pressures to maintain social spending, many rich democracies have increasingly sought to raise funds in financial markets since the 1970s. Using the notion of "infrastructural power," this paper examines the various ways in which states have become infrastructurally entangled with key actors in financial markets that provide the infrastructure of today's markets for government bonds. Drawing on twenty-two interviews with debt managers and market participants, and documentary material, the article analyses the rise to prominence of MTS (Mercato dei Titoli di Stato), an electronic platform for trading government bonds that has become a key feature of Europe's government bond market infrastructure. It traces the emergence of MTS in Italy, its rapid diffusion through Europe and its limited (or even non-existent) success in gaining market share in Germany and the UK. In so doing, this paper finds that some debt management units actively regulate their secondary bond markets to stimulate competition among dealer banks; they "orchestrate" the market for government bonds. Others take a more handsoff approach and only engage with secondary markets mostly as market participants by issuing debt instruments and perhaps buying and selling them in the secondary market. These differences are important for understanding the politics of sovereign debt: they reflect power relations, may impact states' cost of borrowing and their capacity to withstand moments of fiscal stress.

Suggested Citation

  • van der Heide, Arjen, 2024. "Dealing government bonds: Trading infrastructures and infrastructural power in European markets for public debt," MPIfG Discussion Paper 24/2, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:300667
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Streeck Wolfgang, 2014. "The Politics of Public Debt: Neoliberalism, Capitalist Development and the Restructuring of the State," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 143-165, February.
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