The ambiguous consensus on fiscal rules: How ideational ambiguity has facilitated social democratic parties' support of structural deficit rules in the eurozone
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More about this item
Keywords
ambiguous consensus; comparative politics; eurozone governance; fiscal rules; ideationa lambiguity; social democratic parties;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2020-12-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HME-2020-12-14 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
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