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A property rights based consolidation approach

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  • Casajus, André
  • Labrenz, Helfried

Abstract

We suggest a full consolidation approach that takes into account the property rights structure whithin the subsidiaries, in particular, the majority requirements on restructurings. Our approach employs a property rights index based on cooperative game theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Casajus, André & Labrenz, Helfried, 2014. "A property rights based consolidation approach," Working Papers 126, University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:leiwps:126
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Dennis Leech, 1988. "The Relationship Between Shareholding Concentration and Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies: A Study of the Application of Power Indices for Simple Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(4), pages 509-527, April.
    6. Carreras, Francesc & Owen, Guillermo, 1988. "Evaluation of the Catalonian Parliament, 1980-1984," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-92, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    consolidation; majority requirements; property rights; cooperative game theory; Shapley value;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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