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Langfristige Lieferverträge im internationalen Ressourcenhandel

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  • Siebert, Horst

Abstract

Langfristige Lieferverträge sind ein wichtiges institutionelles Arrangement des Ressourcensektors, mit dem ein Abbauunternehmen Risiken verlagern kann. Der Beitrag untersucht die Inzidenz langfristiger Verträge auf das Abbauprofil und die Risikoallokationseigenschaften der Verträge. Dabei wird ein theoretischer Referenzrahmen zur Analyse der Risikoallokation entwickelt. Gleichzeitig werden die heute vorherrschenden Vertragsklauseln wie Rückwärts- und Vorwärtsintegration oder Take or Pay Verträge analysiert. Langfristige Verträge werden in den Kontext anderer Koordinierungsmechanismen wie der Spot- und Terminmärkten eingeordnet. Schließlich wird die Frage untersucht, inwieweit langfristige Verträge als relationale Beziehung stabil sind.
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Suggested Citation

  • Siebert, Horst, 1987. "Langfristige Lieferverträge im internationalen Ressourcenhandel," Discussion Papers, Series II 22, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp2:22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Neu, Axel D., 1999. "Die Gaswirtschaft im Zeichen von Wettbewerb und Umwelt: Perspektiven der Erdgasversorgung im europäischen Binnenmarkt," Kiel Discussion Papers 334/335, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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