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Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?

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  • Lindner, Axel

Abstract

This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Lindner, Axel, 2007. "Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?," IWH Discussion Papers 16/2007, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:iwh-16-07
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/29959/1/557273986.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:zbw:iwhdps:178 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Axel Lindner, 2006. "Does Transparency of Central Banks Produce Multiple Equilibria on Currency Markets?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 1-14, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lindner Axel, 2009. "Evaluating Communication Strategies for Public Agencies: Transparency, Opacity, and Secrecy," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-18, July.
    2. Lindner, Axel, 2008. "Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy," IWH Discussion Papers 8/2008, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    transparency; private information; common knowledge;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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