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Marginal returns to talent for material risk takers in banking

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  • Stieglitz, Moritz
  • Wagner, Konstantin

Abstract

Economies of scale can explain compensation differentials over time, across firms of different size, different hierarchy-levels, and different industries. Consequently, the most talented individuals tend to match with the largest firms in industries where marginal returns to their talent are greatest. We explore a new dimension of this size-pay nexus by showing that marginal returns also differ across activities within firms and industries. Using hand-collected data on managers in European banks well below the level of executive directors, we find that the size-pay nexus is strongest for investment banking business units and for banks with a market-based business model. Thus, managerial compensation is most sensitive to size increases for activities that can easily be scaled up.

Suggested Citation

  • Stieglitz, Moritz & Wagner, Konstantin, 2020. "Marginal returns to talent for material risk takers in banking," IWH Discussion Papers 20/2020, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:202020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banks; business models; marginal returns to talent;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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