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Agency costs in primary dealer systems

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  • Silano, Filippo

Abstract

Easing their access to capital markets, governments have been establishing a primary dealer system. Via bilateral self-enforcing agreements ('dealerships'), government debt management units (DMUs) have been appointing national and global banks (the 'dealers') to actively participate in government securities auctions and/or enhance liquidity in the secondary market. The partnership's non-binding and long-run nature makes dealerships relational contracts. Developing a theoretical framework, this study examines the DMU-dealer principal-agent relationship, with the overarching purpose of identifying and mitigating agency costs. Apart from monitoring costs, the article argues that the partnership entails institutional room for public-private collusion. Although the practice would help fostering the partnership's longevity, it could trigger negative externalities. Mitigating potential risks, policy proposals advocate to enhance: (i) monitoring of the dealers' behaviour in fixed income markets, and (ii) transparency in the DMU's governance of industry's benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Silano, Filippo, 2023. "Agency costs in primary dealer systems," ILE Working Paper Series 69, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ilewps:69
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public finance; government debt management; relational contracts; agency costs; dealers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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