Collusion in the Auction Market for Treasury Bills
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1086/258941
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Guillermo Ordonez & Daniel Neuhann & Harold Cole, 2017.
"A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information,"
2017 Meeting Papers
787, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Harold Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo OrdoƱez, 2018. "A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers 24890, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harold L. Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordonez, 2017. "A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 May 2017.
- Silano, Filippo, 2023. "Agency costs in primary dealer systems," ILE Working Paper Series 69, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:72:y:1964:p:509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.