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Regulierung vertikal strukturierter Industrien: Eine Analyse der Stromwirtschaftschaft auf Grundlage der neuen Institutionenökonomik

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  • Kumkar, Lars

Abstract

In diesem Papier werden Ansatzpunkte zur Regulierung von Stromunternehmen auf ihre Effizienzeigenschaften untersucht. Zu diesem Zweck wird zunächst als analytischer Ausgangspunkt das institutionenökonomische Konzept des Regulierungsvertrags dargestellt und im Anschluß die regulierungsökonomischen Implikationen der technischen Besonderheiten der Stromwirtschaft identifiziert. Dabei werden Fragen der Preisniveau- und Preisstrukturregulierung behandelt. Insbesondere wird darauf eingegangen, welche Konsequenzen aus dem Problem des sogenannten Regulierungsrisikos zu ziehen sind. Im zweiten Hauptteil des Papiers wird untersucht, welche Implikationen sich aus dem Zusammenspiel asymmetrischer Informationen des Regulierers und des Regulierten mit der Existenz vertikal integrierter Stromunternehmen ergeben. Hierbei wird auf Maßnahmen zur Entschärfung der Informationsasymmetrien und auch auf die strukturregulierende Maßnahme der vertikalen Zwangsentflechtung integrierter Unternehmen eingegangen. Das Papier schließt mit einer Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse und der Formulierung einiger Thesen für weitere regulierungsökonomische Untersuchungen.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumkar, Lars, 1998. "Regulierung vertikal strukturierter Industrien: Eine Analyse der Stromwirtschaftschaft auf Grundlage der neuen Institutionenökonomik," Kiel Working Papers 874, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:874
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Daniel F. Spulber, 1989. "Regulation and Markets," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262192756, December.
    6. John Vickers, 1995. "Competition and Regulation in Vertically Related Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(1), pages 1-17.
    7. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kumkar, Lars, 1999. "Zur zukünftigen Regulierungspolitik für die deutsche Stromwirtschaft," Kiel Working Papers 929, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Neu, Axel D., 1999. "Die Gaswirtschaft im Zeichen von Wettbewerb und Umwelt: Perspektiven der Erdgasversorgung im europäischen Binnenmarkt," Kiel Discussion Papers 334/335, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy

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