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Vertragliche Vereinbarungen als Instrument der Wirtschaftspolitik am Beispiel des Altschuldenkompromisses in der ostdeutschen Wohnungswirtschaft

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  • Sander, Birgit

Abstract

Relational contracts when employed as a tool of economic policy create mutual dependency between State and enterprises. This bluntly contradicts the principles of „Ordnungspolitik" as the key policy device to ensure efficiency on the microeconomic level and growth on the macroeconomic level. However, transaction cost theory points to potential transaction cost savings, hence efficiency improving features of relational contracting. The paper analyses the Performance of relational contracting between State and enterprises for the Special case of old debt agreements in east German housing. It discusses transaction characteristics and governance mechanisms as well as reasons, procedures and effects of contract adjustment. It concludes to which degree contractual and policy goals have been accomplished.

Suggested Citation

  • Sander, Birgit, 1997. "Vertragliche Vereinbarungen als Instrument der Wirtschaftspolitik am Beispiel des Altschuldenkompromisses in der ostdeutschen Wohnungswirtschaft," Kiel Working Papers 838, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:838
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Perotti, Enrico C, 1995. "Credible Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 847-859, September.
    2. Sander, Birgit, 1994. "Anpassungsprozesse in der ostdeutschen Wohnungswirtschaft: Analyse und Bewertung," Kiel Discussion Papers 224/225, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets

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