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The Institutional Antecedents of State Utility Regulation: The Chicago Gas Industry, 1860 to 1913

In: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy

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  • Werner Troesken

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  • Werner Troesken, 1994. "The Institutional Antecedents of State Utility Regulation: The Chicago Gas Industry, 1860 to 1913," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 55-80, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:6572
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    1. Blackford, Mansel Griffiths, 1970. "Businessmen and the Regulation of Railroads and Public Utilities in California During the Progressive Era," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 307-319, October.
    2. Alston, Lee J. & Ferrie, Joseph P., 1985. "Labor Costs, Paternalism, and Loyalty in Southern Agriculture: A Constraint on the Growth of the Welfare State," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(1), pages 95-117, March.
    3. Zupan, Mark A, 1989. "The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Television: Some Systematic Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 401-456, October.
    4. Libecap, Gary D, 1992. "The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 242-262, April.
    5. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
    6. Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 656-675, September.
    7. Meyer, Robert A & Leland, Hayne E, 1980. "The Effectiveness of Price Regulation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(4), pages 555-566, November.
    8. Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Regulation and Administered Contracts," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 426-448, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chris Shugart, 1998. "Regulation-by-Contract and Municipal Services: The Problem of Contractual Incompleteness," Development Discussion Papers 1998-09, JDI Executive Programs.
    2. Werner Troesken, 2010. "Competition and Corruption: Lessons from 150 Years of Industrial Governance," Working Paper 426, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2010.

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