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Die Neuorientierung der amerikanischen Energiepolitik

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  • Siebert, Horst

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  • Siebert, Horst, 1981. "Die Neuorientierung der amerikanischen Energiepolitik," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 3573, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:3573
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    1. Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, 1981. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Public Regulation, pages 1-78, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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