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Haushaltskonsolidierung und Subventionsabbau: Wie der Staat seine Handlungsfähigkeit zurückgewinnen kann

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Listed:
  • Boss, Alfred
  • Khalilian, Setareh
  • Klodt, Henning
  • Krieger-Boden, Christiane
  • Laaser, Claus-Friedrich
  • Neuhuber, Kristina
  • Peterson, Sonja
  • Rosenschon, Astrid

Abstract

Die Konsolidierung des Bundeshaushalts, wie sie von der 'Schuldenbremse' des Grundgesetzes gefordert wird, lässt keine Spielräume für ausgabenträchtige Reformprojekte. Die Absichtserklärung der Bundesregierung, die im Koalitionsvertrag vereinbarten Projekte anzugehen, wenn die Haushaltslage es zulässt, kommt unter Status-quo-Bedingungen einer Verschiebung auf den Sankt Nimmerleins-Tag gleich. Der Staat kann aber schon heute seine Reformfähigkeit zurückgewinnen, wenn die Haushaltskonsolidierung durch einen entschlossenen Subventionsabbau flankiert wird. In unserer Studie wird aufgezeigt, wo der Subventionsabbau konkret ansetzen kann. Die Kieler Subventionsampel identifiziert Subventionen in einer Größenordnung von insgesamt 7,5 Mrd. Euro, die aus gesamtwirtschaftlicher Sicht ersatzlos gestrichen werden sollten (Ampelsignal rot). Zusätzlich erfasst die Ampel Subventionen in Höhe von insgesamt 19,7 Mrd. Euro, die zwar gesamtwirtschaftlich sinnvollen Zielen dienen und deshalb im Prinzip beibehalten werden sollten, bei denen aber beträchtliche Einsparungen durch eine effizientere Ausgestaltung der Maßnahmen möglich wären (Ampelsignal gelb). Unsere Studie konzentriert sich auf die Finanzhilfen des Bundes und die Steuervergünstigungen, und zwar in den Bereichen Energie und Umwelt, Regionalpolitik, Verkehr und Sektorbeihilfen. Daneben gibt es eine Reihe weiterer Politikbereiche sowie die Finanzhilfen der anderen Gebietskörperschaften, die hier nicht untersucht wurden, die aber ebenfalls erhebliche Potenziale zum Subventionsabbau bieten. Ein erfolgreicher Subventionsabbau würde nicht nur der Politik ihre fiskalische Handlungsfähigkeit zurückgeben, sondern vor allem Allokationsverzerrungen und verfälschte Anreizstrukturen in der Wirtschaft reduzieren und dadurch den gesamtwirtschaftlichen Wohlstand mehren.

Suggested Citation

  • Boss, Alfred & Khalilian, Setareh & Klodt, Henning & Krieger-Boden, Christiane & Laaser, Claus-Friedrich & Neuhuber, Kristina & Peterson, Sonja & Rosenschon, Astrid, 2011. "Haushaltskonsolidierung und Subventionsabbau: Wie der Staat seine Handlungsfähigkeit zurückgewinnen kann," Kieler Beiträge zur Wirtschaftspolitik 3, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkbw:3
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