Die Genossenschaftliche Institutssicherung – ein notwendiges Instrument zur Stärkung des Kundenvertrauens und des Risikomanagements im dezentralen Bankenverbund
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- Pier Carlo Padoan & Paul A. Brenton & Gavin Boyd (ed.), 2003. "The Structural Foundations of International Finance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3084, March.
- Calomiris, Charles W., 1990. "Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 283-295, June.
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Cited by:
- Horsch Andreas & Kleinow Jacob & Schiele Christian, 2018. "Proportionale Bankenregulierung: Chance für Genossenschaftsbanken?," Zeitschrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen, De Gruyter, vol. 68(1), pages 56-65, March.
- Gleber Peter, 2018. "Selbstbestimmtes Sparen durch Genossenschaften: Ein historischer Überblick," Zeitschrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen, De Gruyter, vol. 68(2), pages 122-130, June.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
- N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-
- N34 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: 1913-
- N94 - Economic History - - Regional and Urban History - - - Europe: 1913-
- P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GER-2017-07-02 (German Papers)
- NEP-HIS-2017-07-02 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
- NEP-RMG-2017-07-02 (Risk Management)
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