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Political competition and support for agriculture

Author

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  • Fałkowski, Jan
  • Olper, Alessandro

Abstract

This paper investigates whether political competition plays an important role in determining the level of agricultural protection. In order to do so, we exploit variation in political and economic data from 74 developing and developed countries for the post-war period. Our results robustly show that the level of agricultural distortions is the higher, the higher is the level of political competition. We show that political competition may importantly complement other institutional aspects in determining policy choices. We investigate the heterogeneous effects of political competition across different electoral rules (majoritarian vs. proportional), forms of government (coalition vs. single-party) and level of incomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Fałkowski, Jan & Olper, Alessandro, 2010. "Political competition and support for agriculture," IAMO Forum 2010: Institutions in Transition – Challenges for New Modes of Governance 52697, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iamo10:52697
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
    2. repec:lic:licosd:25109 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen E., 1988. "An overlapping generations model of electoral competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 359-379, December.
    4. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Roberto Perotti & Massimo Rostagno, 2002. "Electoral Systems and Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(2), pages 609-657.
    5. Alessandro Olper & Valentina Raimondi, 2010. "Constitutional Reforms and Food Policy," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 93(2), pages 324-331.
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    Cited by:

    1. Klomp, Jeroen, 2014. "The political economy of agricultural liberalization in Central and Eastern Europe: An empirical analysis," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(P1), pages 332-346.
    2. Jeroen Klomp & Jakob de Haan, 2013. "Conditional Election and Partisan Cycles in Government Support to the Agricultural Sector: An Empirical Analysis," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(4), pages 793-818.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political competition; constitutional rules; agricultural distortions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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