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The optimal pricing strategy for an insurer when risk preferences are stochastically distributed

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Listed:
  • Hofmann, Annette
  • Nell, Martin
  • Pohl, Philipp

Abstract

The present paper analyzes the demand for insurance when the insurer has incomplete information about types of potential customers. We assume that customers' risk preferences cannot be distinguished by the insurer. Therefore, the standard result in insurance economics that the insurer discriminates perfectly in prices cannot be applied. Instead, the present article examines the optimal pricing rule for an insurer faced with stochastic distribution of risk preferences. Within this general model framework, we show that an optimal strategy always exists. Both fixed and proportionate premium loadings (relative to expected loss) are considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Hofmann, Annette & Nell, Martin & Pohl, Philipp, 2007. "The optimal pricing strategy for an insurer when risk preferences are stochastically distributed," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 20, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:hzvwps:20
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Ramsay, Colin M., 2005. "Pricing optional group term insurance: a new approach using reservation prices," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 37-55, February.
    4. Kliger, Doron & Levikson, Benny, 1998. "Pricing insurance contracts -- an economic viewpoint," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 243-249, July.
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