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Anmerkungen zur möglichen geldpolitischen Exit-Strategie der EZB

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  • Treu, Johannes

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  • Treu, Johannes, 2010. "Anmerkungen zur möglichen geldpolitischen Exit-Strategie der EZB," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 04/2010, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:grewdp:042010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    2. Kris James Mitchener & Joseph Mason, 2010. "'Blood and treasure': exiting the Great Depression and lessons for today," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 26(3), pages 510-539, Autumn.
    3. Ansgar Belke, 2010. "Financial Crisis, Global Liquidity and Monetary Exit Strategies," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 995, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Treu, Johannes, 2011. "Politökonomische Modellierung eines Abstimmungsprozesses zwischen der Europäischen Zentralbank und den Mitgliedstaaten der Eurozone in Zeiten hoher Staatsverschuldung," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 05/2011, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.

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