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How authoritarian regimes counter international sanctions pressure

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  • von Soest, Christian

Abstract

Based on current literature, this paper analyses the nature and effects of external pressure imposed on authoritarian regimes. Around three-quarters of all countries under United Nations, United States, and European Union sanctions are authoritarian, and 'democracy sanctions' that aim at improving democratic and human rights in targeted countries constitute the biggest sanctions category. Yet, authoritarian regimes represent particularly problematic targets as they can more easily shield themselves from external pressure than their democratic counterparts can. Authoritarians have a tighter grip on the public discourse and the struggle over the meaning of sanctions. They often even use them to their own advantage, denouncing sanction senders as 'imperialist' and blaming them for their economic woes. The paper presents trends in the application of sanctions pressure against authoritarian regimes, reviews mechanisms of how economic and diplomatic restrictions work, and examines authoritarian targets' attempts to engage in pressure proofing.

Suggested Citation

  • von Soest, Christian, 2023. "How authoritarian regimes counter international sanctions pressure," GIGA Working Papers 336, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:gigawp:336
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wintrobe,Ronald, 2000. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521794497, October.
    2. Gerschewski, Johannes, 2013. "The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 20(1), pages 13-38.
    3. Nikolay Marinov, 2005. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 49(3), pages 564-576, July.
    4. Jones, Lee, 2015. "Societies Under Siege: Exploring How International Economic Sanctions (Do Not) Work," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198749325.
    5. Drezner, Daniel W., 2000. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 73-102, January.
    6. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2007. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition (hardcover)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4075, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Authoritarian regimes; external pressure; sanctions; rally-round-the-flag effect; pressure proofing;
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