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The influence of social capital on CEO dismissal in Germany: an empirical analysis

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  • Wrage, Markus
  • Tuschke, Anja
  • Bresser, Rudi K. F.

Abstract

In this study, we address the question of why some CEOs stay in office during a performance downturn while others don't. Based on a social capital perspective we assume that (1) the social capital endowment of an underperforming CEO may reduce the risk of getting dismissed and that (2) the tendency of board members to dismiss the CEO is moderated by their own social capital. Using data of large German corporations, we find support for our assumptions regarding the influence of a CEO's social capital on the risk of getting dismissed. We find partial evidence for a moderating effect of the social capital of board members. Our findings' implications for the literatures on social capital and CEO turnover are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Wrage, Markus & Tuschke, Anja & Bresser, Rudi K. F., 2011. "The influence of social capital on CEO dismissal in Germany: an empirical analysis," Discussion Papers 2011/5, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard A. D'Aveni & Idalene F. Kesner, 1993. "Top Managerial Prestige, Power and Tender Offer Response: A Study of Elite Social Networks and Target Firm Cooperation during Takeovers," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(2), pages 123-151, May.
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    Keywords

    CEO turnover; board interlocks; social capital;
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