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Wettbewerb und Wettbewerbsvorschriften im Gesundheitswesen

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  • Baake, Pio
  • Kuchinke, Björn A.
  • Wey, Christian

Abstract

Die letzten beiden Gesundheitsreformen (GKV-WSG, GKVOrg-WG) hatten das Ziel, den Wettbewerb im Gesundheitswesen zu stärken. Als zentraler Bestandteil ist ein neues Selektivvertragssystem eingeführt worden, welches das Kollektivsystem zumindest teilweise ablöst. Im Beitrag wird zunächst gezeigt und analysiert, ob tatsächlich neue Spielräume für mehr Wettbewerb geschaffen worden sind und worin die Vorteile eines funktionierenden Wettbewerbs bestehen. Anschließend widmet sich der Beitrag der Frage, ob die neuen wettbewerblichen Möglichkeiten ausreichend durch die bestehenden Regeln geschützt werden. Das Ergebnis lautet hier, die Vorschriften des GWB vollständig und konsequent auf der Versicherungs- sowie auf der Anbieterseite anzuwenden, um den Wettbewerb wirksam schützen zu können. Ansonsten können die herausgearbeiteten positiven Effekte für die Versicherten bzw. Patienten nicht erzielt werden.

Suggested Citation

  • Baake, Pio & Kuchinke, Björn A. & Wey, Christian, 2010. "Wettbewerb und Wettbewerbsvorschriften im Gesundheitswesen," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 05, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:diceop:05
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roman Inderst & Christian Wey, 2008. "Die Wettbewerbsanalyse von Nachfragemacht aus verhandlungstheoretischer Sicht," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(4), pages 465-485, November.
    2. Roman Inderst & Tommaso M. Valletti, 2011. "Buyer Power And The ‘Waterbed Effect’," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 1-20, March.
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    1. Coenen, Michael & Haucap, Justus, 2013. "Kommunal- statt Missbrauchsaufsicht: Zur Aufsicht über Trinkwasserentgelte nach der 8. GWB-Novelle," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 53, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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